University of Dayton

eCommons
Educational Leadership Faculty Publications

Department of Educational Leadership

11-2013

Update: The Supreme Court and Affirmative
Action
Charles J. Russo
University of Dayton, crusso1@udayton.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/eda_fac_pub
Part of the Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Research Commons, Educational
Leadership Commons, Education Law Commons, Elementary and Middle and Secondary
Education Administration Commons, Higher Education Administration Commons, and the
Supreme Court of the United States Commons
eCommons Citation
Russo, Charles J., "Update: The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action" (2013). Educational Leadership Faculty Publications. 164.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/eda_fac_pub/164

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Educational Leadership at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Educational Leadership Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact
frice1@udayton.edu, mschlangen1@udayton.edu.

legal and legislative issues

Update: The Supreme Court
and Affirmative Action
By Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D.

Few issues in
education have
generated more
ongoing controversy
during the last
half-century than
affirmative action.

F

ew issues in education have generated more ongoing controversy
during the last half-century than
afﬁrmative action. Supporters view
it as a positive step to eliminate the effects
of past discrimination. Conversely, critics
speak of race-conscious policies that they
maintain create greater problems by failing
to address how granting preferences today
remedies past inequities.
Although typically more contentious in
higher education, afﬁrmative action is the
centerpiece of this column because of the
impact that race-conscious policies can have
on K–12 schools.
Legal History of Affirmative Action
“Afﬁrmative action” was introduced into
the national legal lexicon when President
Kennedy issued an executive order in March
1961 that primarily directed government
contractors to “take afﬁrmative action to
ensure that applicants are employed and
that employees are treated during employment without regard to their race, creed,
color, or national origin.”
Following the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, afﬁrmative action was enforced
for the ﬁrst time when President Lyndon B.
Johnson signed Executive Order 11,246 in
September 1965. This directive conﬁrmed
the government’s commitment by declaring that it would take “afﬁrmative action
to ensure that applicants are employed . . .
without regard to their race, creed, color or
national origin” (3 C.F.R. Part 340, 1965).
In October 1967, President Johnson’s
Executive Order 11,375 extended afﬁrmative action to women. That order expanded
the deﬁnition of afﬁrmative action to include
“sex” (32 Fed. Reg. 14,303, 1965) in directing afﬁrmative action policies to take “race,
color, religion, sex, [and/]or national origin”
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into consideration in order to ensure compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Litigation
Regardless of whether the practice is
referred to as afﬁrmative action or race-conscious policies, it has led to a steady supply
of litigation that has reached the Supreme
Court.
The Court’s ﬁrst case on afﬁrmative
action, De Funis v. Odegaard (1974), was a
dispute from Washington State. The justices
vacated an order from state courts upholding the use of a race-conscious admissions
policy in a public law school but chose not
to address whether afﬁrmative action was
constitutionally permissible.
Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke (1978) was the ﬁrst Supreme Court
case on the merits of afﬁrmative action.
A divided Court reached two different
outcomes, ruling that a medical school’s
afﬁrmative-action admissions policy was
unconstitutional, yet forbidding any consideration of race in admissions, allowing it to
be used as a “plus” factor that may elevate
one candidate over another.
The Supreme Court refused to allow
race to be a factor in a case involving public school teachers, ﬁnding in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education (1989) that the
layoffs of nonminorities based solely on race
violated equal protection.
In Gratz v. Bollinger (2003), the Supreme
Court reiterated that diversity can constitute a compelling state interest. Even so, the
justices invalidated an undergraduate admissions policy as not narrowly tailored enough
to achieve the state’s goal of achieving a
diverse student body.
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) was a landmark case in which the Supreme Court
upheld the afﬁrmative-action admissions
policy of the University of Michigan Law
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School, ruling that the school had
a compelling interest in promoting
class diversity and that an admissions
process that may favor “underrepresented minority groups” but that
also considered other factors did not
amount to a quota system.
Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District
No.1 (PICS 2007) considered the
use of race in admissions in K–12
schools in Seattle, Washington, and
Louisville, Kentucky. In PICS, the
Court observed that Seattle neither
operated racially segregated schools
nor had ever been subject to a
court-ordered desegregation order;
Louisville was declared unitary,
meaning that its schools were no longer segregated by race, and released
from judicial supervision in 2000.
The Court decided that ofﬁcials in
both districts failed to demonstrate
that the use of race in the student
assignment plans was necessary to
achieve their stated goals of racial

diversity because they overlooked
alternative approaches.
Fisher v. University of Texas
In Fisher v. University of Texas
(2009), Abigail Fisher, a white
high school student, ﬁled a lawsuit
contending that she was denied
admission to the University of
Texas-Austin in the fall of 2008
because she was white. The state
requires all students in the top
10% of their high school classes to
be admitted to state universities,
but students who fall short of that
threshold are admitted according to
a formula that combines other factors, such as academic achievement,
leadership, family circumstances,
and race. Fisher’s lawsuit is based
on a claim that any consideration of
race by a university in admissions
violates the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After a federal trial court in Texas
and the Fifth Circuit agreed that the
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university’s consideration of race
as a factor in admissions met the
standards laid out in Grutter, the
plaintiff requested a review by the
higher court.
Justice Anthony Kennedy began by
pointing out that university ofﬁcials
treated race as one of a variety of
factors in the admissions process in
pursuit of a critical mass of minority
students and thus identiﬁed the issue
as the Court being asked to review
whether the Fifth Circuit’s order was
consistent with its decisions interpreting the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, including
Grutter v. Bollinger. After determining that the Fifth Circuit failed
to apply strict scrutiny, the highest
level of constitutional analysis, as
mandated by Grutter and Bakke, the
Court remanded Fisher for further
consideration.
Justice Kennedy indicated that
while the justices agreed that
university ofﬁcials demonstrated
that—consistent with Grutter—
diversity was a compelling interest
that was essential to the university’s
mission, they failed to devise a
plan that was narrowly tailored to
achieve their goal without using a
race-conscious remedy.
Justice Kennedy next explained
that institutional ofﬁcials can no
longer deﬁne diversity as “some speciﬁed percentage of a particular group
merely because of its race or ethnic
origin [since t]hat would amount
to outright racial balancing, which
is patently unconstitutional” (p.
2419). He indicated that the judiciary
must be convinced that ofﬁcials created admissions processes designed
to “ensure that each applicant is
evaluated as an individual and not in
a way that makes an applicant’s race
or ethnicity the deﬁning feature of his
or her application” (p. 2418, citing
Grutter at 337).
Rounding out the Supreme Court’s
opinion, Justice Kennedy declared
that ofﬁcials must demonstrate that
“no workable race neutral alternatives would produce the educational
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beneﬁts of diversity” (p. 2420), a
standard that the Fifth Circuit mistakenly failed to apply. The Court
thus directed the Fifth Circuit to
apply the correct standard of review.
Reﬂections
For supporters of afﬁrmative action,
Fisher can be described as a kind
of half-loaf outcome. On the one
hand, the Supreme Court recognized
diversity as a compelling government interest. On the other hand,
although the Court found that
university ofﬁcials failed to devise a
plan that was sufﬁciently narrowly
tailored to achieve their goal, it did
not explicitly forbid the use of race
as a factor in admissions policies.
Still, in directing ofﬁcials to prove
that they have compelling interests if
they take race into consideration in
admissions—regardless of whether
programs are in K–12 schools or
higher education—the result in
Fisher is likely to make it more difﬁcult for administrators to do so.
Educators would be wise to take
into account alternative factors, such
as family socioeconomic status, when
providing programming for qualiﬁed students. By considering family
socioeconomic status when providing
programming for qualiﬁed students
from lower- and middle-income
backgrounds, educational institutions may better serve the neediest
and most deserving applicants while
establishing pools that are more
diverse on a variety of levels.
In K-12 schools in particular,
socioeconomic status is something
for school business ofﬁcials, their
boards, and other education leaders
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to think about if their students apply
for admission or if state laws allow
them to work with charter schools
within their districts.
An additional beneﬁt of taking
socioeconomic status into account is
that if it is used to expand the criteria for achieving diversity in student
bodies, then afﬁrmative action might
become more palatable to its critics by helping create larger pools of
applicants. To this end, it is unfortunate that rather than establish
criteria for reviewing the constitutionality of race-based admissions
policies, the Fisher Court left this
issue up to the institution’s ofﬁcials
by returning the dispute to the Fifth
Circuit for further consideration.
Another shortcoming in Fisher
is that the Supreme Court failed to
provide clear standards to guide
admissions ofﬁcers, such as requiring
them to take a student socioeconomic status into consideration
or directing them to explain how
much weight they assign to racial
qualiﬁcations when evaluating applications. By simply declaring that the
university policy failed to provide
a compelling interest in pursuit of
diversifying its student body, the
Court inadvertently set the stage for
additional litigation.
Conclusion
As is typically the case when dealing with contentious issues, Fisher
is unlikely to be the last word on
race-conscious policies. In fact, since
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, in disputes from Michigan and California,
respectively, reached different results
on the use of race in education and
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other arenas, the Supreme Court has
stepped into the fray.
The Supreme Court has agreed
to review the case from Michigan,
wherein the Sixth Circuit invalidated
a voter-approved state constitutional
amendment that forbade ofﬁcials at
public colleges and universities, elementary and secondary schools, and
other arenas from granting racial
preferences. Since this case from
Michigan is on the docket for the
Court’s 2013-2014 term, this dispute
bears watching because it is likely to
provide further guidance about the
role of race in education.
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